

Napoleon's Hundred Days and the Shaping of a Dutch Identity

Lotte Jensen

Dutch people! – brave! – good hearted!
Brothers, Belgians! Noble family
Too long were we separated,
Now our destiny is one
Let us sing united together
Humanity's triumphant song.¹

With these words, a poet from the Dutch city of Alkmaar celebrated the taking of Paris and the defeat of Napoleon by the allied forces in July 1815. It is clear that to his mind the victory should be celebrated together by the Dutch and Belgian people. Having been separated for so long, destiny had now reunited them. The author emphasised the familiar relationship between both nations by using words like “brothers” (*broeders*) and “family” (*kroost*).

The political union between the Dutch and Belgian people was of a very recent date: only a year before, on 21 June 1814, had it been decided, in a confidential treaty—the Eight Articles of London—that the

L. Jensen (✉)
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands
e-mail: l.jensen@let.ru.nl

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Belgian Provinces would be added to the territory of the Netherlands. This treaty may be regarded as a diplomatic victory for the Dutch sovereign William I and his negotiators, who began their move for territorial expansion several months before his return from exile in November 1813.² On 16 March 1815, shortly after Napoleon's escape from Elba, William proclaimed himself as the king of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Before that, his official title had been "Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands," a deliberate choice. Although the majority of the people seemed to be in favour of the new Orangist regime, that did not mean that the Dutch, with their long history of republicanism, were ready to accept a king.³ The sudden return of Napoleon put things in a different perspective and prompted William to make a clear statement. However, it wasn't until 9 June 1815, with the signing of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, that the new monarchy under the rule of William I was officially recognised by the other European powers.⁴

By July 1815, the union between the Dutch and Belgian people had already taken firm shape in the mind of the above-mentioned poet. Moreover, throughout the Hundred Days many Dutch authors expressed their views on current political affairs on France and on the union. In this chapter, I explore popular reactions to the decisions that were made at a diplomatic level, in particular those concerning the Netherlands. How did authors react to the return of Napoleon and to the proclaimed union with the southern people of Belgium, and to what extent did they refer to the diplomatic negotiations of the Congress of Vienna? What shape did national identity take in Dutch popular responses to the Hundred Days, and did this national identity include both the northern and southern provinces?

My main source is the collection of Early Modern Pamphlets, which is kept in the Royal Library at The Hague: it contains approximately eighty pamphlets from Napoleon's Hundred Days; in 22 of these explicit references to the political union is made.⁵ Although this collection contains only part of all printed matter, it does offer a broad window into popular thought on national identity in the period. These occasional writings vary in form and length: they include heroic poems, treatises, essays, dialogues, and plays.

These resources demonstrate that the political union between the Dutch and Belgian people became topical at two particular moments: (1) directly after William's proclamation as king of the United Netherlands on 16 March 1815; and (2) after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo.

However, reactions were dominated by the Northern Dutch perspective, which was strongly coloured by the years of Napoleonic annexation.⁶ What is more, southern authors developed their own discourse on "national" identity, which only partly overlapped with the northern narrative. As a result, two different cultures of identity were being created, which reflected the difficulties of melding the two nations that had been divided since their breakup in 1579 during the Eighty Years' War. Before discussing the contents of the pamphlets, I will briefly recall the diplomatic background as well as the chronological events that led to the creation of a new Dutch kingdom during the years 1813–1815.

AN INTIMATE AND COMPLETE UNION

The Hundred Days were part of a longer process of nation forming in the Netherlands that dates back to the sixteenth century. A perception of the Low Countries as the common fatherland can already be witnessed in the mid-sixteenth century.⁷ This view spread rapidly during the Revolt against Spain and took firm political shape with the establishment of the Union of Utrecht in 1579, which united the seven northern provinces in their struggle to liberate themselves from Spanish oppression. This treaty not only marked the foundation of the Republic of Seven United Provinces, it also led to a political rupture with the southern provinces, which banded together in the Union of Arras (1579). The Eighty Years' War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Münster in 1648 and the official acknowledgement of the Dutch Republic as a sovereign state. The celebration of this event—as well as the continuing commemoration of the Dutch victories of the Eighty Years' War—contributed significantly to the development of a national consciousness.⁸ In the second half of the eighteenth century, it became common to use the term "fatherland" to refer to the Republic as a whole, and there was even quite a "fatherland cult."⁹ Feelings of national awareness reached a height at the beginning of the nineteenth century during the years of the French occupation (1806–1813). Napoleon was considered a major threat to Dutch national identity, and authors went to great lengths to celebrate Dutch national values and heroes in their writings by expressing their disgust with the French regime.¹⁰

The years after the liberation from the French (1813–1815) marked a new era in the history of the Dutch nation. It was characterised by the creation of a new kingdom reuniting the southern and northern

provinces. In the development of this so-called United Kingdom of the Netherlands, several dates are of great importance. The first date is 30 November 1813. On that day, William Frederick, the son of the former stadtholder William V, returned to the Netherlands. Several months later, on 30 March 1814, he took the oath on the new constitution and was officially inaugurated as "sovereign Prince of the Netherlands." His reign as yet did not include the southern provinces, but his ambition was to augment his territory.¹¹

As the historian Niek van Sas has convincingly argued, the shaping of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was not only an invention of the Great Powers but also the result of effective and steadfast diplomatic pressure by Prince William and his staff. As a result of the diplomatic skills of, amongst others, his secretary of state Anton Reinhard Falck, the politician Gijsbrecht Karel van Hogendorp, and the German nobleman Hans Christoph von Gagern, Prince William quickly managed to achieve this goal.¹² In the Eight Articles of London of 21 June 1814, it was stated that the Dutch territory would be augmented with the Belgian Provinces. The text of the first article reads:

The union shall be intimate and complete, so that the two countries shall form only a single state to be governed by the Fundamental Law already established in Holland, which by mutual consent shall be modified according to the circumstances.¹³

The expression "intimate and complete" first and foremost refers to a complete juridical and political integration of both nations, but it also carries an emotional connotation. It suggests that a real political union can only be achieved if mutual feelings of kinship and affect are also established.

Shortly after signing the Eight Articles of London in August 1814, Prince William appointed a temporary government in the Belgian provinces. He vigorously started to strengthen his new state and took a variety of measures to achieve a closer union between the two nations. One of his most important measures was the Language Act (*Taalbesluit*), announced on 1 October 1814, which made the Dutch language the official language in the Belgian Provinces. Other measures were concerned with the freedom of the press and marriage policy: Respectively, freedom of press was restricted by law in September 1814, and it became almost impossible for Protestants to marry Catholics.¹⁴

In the same period, peace negotiations started in Vienna. It was Von Gagern's mission to make sure that the political union between the northern and southern provinces was acknowledged as well as reclaiming the hereditary lands of Nassau and expanding territory in the eastern part of the Netherlands.¹⁵ The Eight Articles of London still had to be ratified by the Congress of Vienna, but Napoleon's return from exile sped up the process. The stability of Europe was once more threatened, and William took a firm stand by proclaiming himself the king of the United Netherlands on 16 March 1815. It would take another three months before the new state and its king were officially acknowledged in the Treaty of Vienna, which was signed on 9 June 1815.

All of these decisions were made at the highest diplomatic level behind closed doors, but how did people other than the professional agents of diplomacy respond to these political decisions? What sense of national identity was put forward in occasional writings during the Hundred Days? This focus on popular reactions is inspired by current trends in international relations and cultural history, which promoted an investigation of the interaction between popular culture and transnational politics as a multidirectional process.¹⁶ Peace-making and securing the future Europe were certainly the core business of policymakers and diplomats, but they also operated within a larger cultural framework, in which pamphlets, poetry, and newspapers played an important role.¹⁷ Although political decision-making was a top-down process, political rulers increasingly realised the potential uses of and need for public media and its role in securing popular support. A lack of public support meant risking protests and revolts. Indeed, the autocratic leaders of the post-Napoleonic decades would become obsessed with suppressing potential resistance to their regimes to the extent that one could say that they were fighting against a "phantom terror," as Adam Zamoyski has aptly called it.¹⁸ Nevertheless, their fear had some basis in reality: The recent history of the Dutch state included a period as the Republic of Batavia (1795–1806), a French satellite. King William I was, in other words, dealing with a people that had overthrown its previous Orangist regime. During his reign, the enforced political union with the southern provinces led to many tensions, resulting ultimately in a revolution that would lead to the creation of Belgium as an independent state in the years 1830–1832.¹⁹

The fact that the political union with the southern provinces failed reminds us that one key feature of this revolutionary period is a shift from

Romanticism to seeing nations as held together not only by territorial borders, governmental policies, and legal texts but also by a sense of belonging to the same community. National communities came to be seen as rooted as much in cultural and historical traditions as in legislation.²⁰ Cultural and emotional attachments to the nation were increasingly seen as elements that needed to be mobilised through shared history, language, habits, and values. It was exactly at this point that the southern and northern parts of this new United Kingdom diverged.

This divergence had its origin in the above-mentioned separation of the Low Countries in 1579 with the signing of the Union of Utrecht, which unified the northern provinces in their struggle against the Spanish enemy. By signing the Treaty of Utrecht, the southern provinces chose the side of the Catholic Spanish king Philip II. This rupture led to the development of two distinct national sentiments, a gap which would only enlarge over the course of the next centuries.²¹ One of the main differences was that of religious denomination: Catholicism was dominant in the south, whereas the Dutch Republic built its system of values on protestant beliefs. Another difference was the state of independency. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands officially gained sovereignty in 1648, whereas the southern provinces were permanently ruled by foreign powers, consecutively, by the Spanish, Austrians, and French. When the French were defeated in 1814, it was not clear what the future would hold for the former Austrian Netherlands. Several scenarios were possible: a restoration of the former ties with Austria, unification with the French, annexation with the northern Netherlands, or independence.²²

William I had his way, and the southern provinces were added to his reign. However, this did not mean that an "intimate and complete union" could be easily realised. On the contrary, there was a mental gap of more than two centuries to overcome, and the southern people were deeply divided internally. Some southerners sympathised with Napoleon and the French, whereas others preferred a union with the northern Netherlands or opted for an independent nation state. As a result, William faced a very difficult challenge, which involved more than just introducing new laws and regulations. The Hundred Days became a perfect test case for assessing the impact of Napoleon's return on the forging of a new Dutch national identity that included both the northern and southern provinces.

MARCH 1815: UNITED WE STAND TOGETHER

The news of Napoleon's escape from Elba caused a great stir amongst the diplomats and rulers of Europe, who had been laboriously bargaining over the division of the Europe at the congress of Vienna. The French diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand in particular was under considerable pressure; he took a firm stand by having the congress declare Napoleon an outlaw. Consequently, the allied powers, including the government of the French King Louis XVIII, joined forces to stop Napoleon's advance.

Napoleon's return also caused a shock in the Netherlands. The *Rotterdamsche Courant* released an extra issue entirely devoted to his escape. Dutch readers were assured that in Paris the Ministry of War was working day and night to cope with the crisis and that severe measures would be taken against those who supported a man who had spilled so much blood all over Europe.²³ At the same time, William wanted to make sure that the southern borders of his young (but still not officially recognised) kingdom would be protected. He had his troops take up strategic positions and offered the French king full assistance, even to the extent that he was prepared to intervene in France.²⁴ The allied forces, however, decided not to intervene directly and started reinforcing their troops for a later showdown. For his part, William managed to recruit nearly 30,000 men, of which approximately one third came from the southern provinces.²⁵

During these turbulent weeks, the main topic of Dutch pamphleteers was to call their fellow countrymen to arms.²⁶ All men had to join the army of the allied forces in order to stop the "monster from Corsica" as quickly as possible. Both male and female authors emphasised the necessity of supporting the allied forces. One of the most well-known Dutch female authors of that time, Petronella Moens (1762–1843), published a poem entitled "On Napoleon Bonaparte's entering of Paris" (*Bij het intrekken van Napoleon Buonaparte in Parijs*). To strengthen her address, she included emotional calls from three different groups: fathers, mothers and wives, and young girls of marriageable age ("the Dutch virgins"). Each group voiced an emotional appeal to the men and encouraged them to enlist and fight. The conclusion of the poem was that the Dutch would be able to defeat Napoleon with the support of their king and with God on their side:

No, dear Fatherland, with such heroic souls
 With such an honourable King, you don't have to be afraid of
 betrayal or power [...]
 Yes, the heart's blood of the Dutch youth will flow to the last drop
 [...]
 Before the Corsican gets the chance to let his eagle fly again
 The glorious Netherland will triumph brotherly
 God will crown the king's virtue and support the triumph of the
 heroic people.²⁷

Moens gave women a strong voice in her poem, but she was not exceptional in this. The 54-year-old poet Maria Petronella Elter-Woesthoven (1760–1830) also called the “Batavians” to action. The tyrant Napoleon had to be destroyed before he had the chance to destroy them. She even suggested that even “weak women” might turn into killers themselves if Napoleon turned out to be unstoppable.²⁸

Many pamphleteers referred to the great past of the nation, in which the Dutch had proved their bravery against the Spaniards during the Eighty Years' War. They took William of Orange as a role model, who had led the Dutch during the revolt. The new sovereign was referred to as “the second First William” to suggest continuity between the past and the present.²⁹ Authors unanimously praised the new king for being a courageous man taking the lead in the fight for freedom. A minister from Schiedam for instance wrote: “Come on, take your weapons from the wall! / It is for the fight of the Fatherland, / For God and for the King!!”³⁰

POLITICAL AWARENESS

It is striking how quickly and smoothly the term “king” was adopted. Although the country had been transferred into a kingdom between 1806 and 1810 during the French occupation, it had not been clear from the start that the nation would turn into monarchy after the liberation from the French at the end of 1813. The Dutch had a long history of being a republic, and not everybody was immediately willing to accept the idea of having the Nassau family restored to power again.³¹ In March 1815, the tide had obviously turned: facing such a new major threat, pamphleteers unanimously expressed their loyalty and support for their new king. In a way, one could say, William profited from the

new political situation. Internal political struggles were set aside, and it strengthened his plea for a “complete and intimate union” between the northern and southern provinces.

This becomes clear from the popular reactions to these events, which reveal that there was a general awareness of the significance of the new political constellation. In some of these writings, William I was explicitly referred to as the mutual king of the Dutch and Belgian people. A ship architect from Dordrecht encouraged Belgian and Batavian soldiers to join the fight for the sake of *their* prince and fatherland.³² J. S. Swaan, dean of a Latin school in Hoorn, did not neglect the differences between the Belgian and Dutch but saw the reunion of both nations as a positive development:

You see in the shadow of the throne
 The arrows bound again
 That grim fate had torn apart
 For two centuries. [...]
 Batavian and Belgian join forces
 They have their own fatherland.
 They have their own fame to shore up.
 The tree of Orange bears fruit for both.³³

The union was clearly seen as a profitable and necessary bond that was required to stand up against the new threat Napoleon posed to Europe. The same thoughts were expressed by an anonymous author, who called himself “Patriot” (*Vaderlander*). He argued that the great powers should unite to conquer Napoleon and that this call for unity also applied to the Belgian and Batavian people:

Help God! — inspire, strengthen the Great Alexander!
 Help Austria! — Germany! The noble Prussian Brith!
 May all rulers resolutely join forces;
 To achieve your holy goal and know:
 Thus Belgians *and* Batavians do battle! With their Orange King!
 Together in concord to defend the Netherlands.³⁴

In poems like these, written at the beginning of the Hundred Days, the union between North and South was represented as something that would strengthen the allied forces against Napoleon. Their mutual

source of inspiration was considered to be King William, in whose name they were fighting the enemy.

March and April 1815 also saw the publication of several essays, in which the current political situation was discussed. Two highly prolific intellectuals—Jacobus Scheltema and Jan ten Brink—stated that the allied forces should immediately recognise the rights of the Dutch sovereign William.³⁵ Both had supported the anti-Orangist party in the past but now whole-heartedly supported the prince of Orange. The best defence was to create a wall of protection (*voormuur*), which basically meant that union was the only way to counter the new international crisis. Scheltema pointed to France's many interferences in the provinces of Flanders and Brabant in the past, which made it absolutely clear that the political stability could only be secured by creating a large buffer zone. At the internal political level, discord had to be avoided at all times: "the name of Netherlander, must bind all hearts together, our language is that which binds us."³⁶ This was a clear reference to the Language Act of 1814, which made Dutch the official language of the southern provinces and which Scheltema embraced.

A firm stand was also taken by an anonymous author who published a conversation between three friends about the current political situation, *Waarom vreest men toch thans zoo zeer of bemoedigende gesprekken tussen drie vrienden* (Why is everybody so afraid now, or, encouraging conversations between three friends). The author stated that it was important that all Dutch people showed their loyalty to the new king even though some of them might not have been strong adherents of the House of Orange in the past. The time had now come to be "real Dutchmen" and to join forces in the struggle against Napoleon, and this explicitly included the inhabitants of the southern provinces.³⁷ The question was raised whether the Belgian people would feel inclined to support the new king or whether they would lean in favour of Napoleon. There was no doubt, one of the friends replied, that the Belgians would prefer to stay under the "soft reign" of William, enjoying their freedom, privileges and religiousness, rather than having to bend, once again, beneath the iron sceptre of Napoleon.³⁸

These utterances of support may give the impression that everybody supported the Dutch king, but the propagandistic tone suggests that some people still had to be convinced of the advantages of his policy. Critical reactions, however, are hardly to be found. The pamphlet collection only contains one negative response by a certain M. Schilderman,

author of *Le cri de l'oppression ou lettre d'un Belge à ses concitoyens* (The cry of oppression or letter of a Belgian to his fellow citizens). This anti-Orangist pamphlet was published in Paris, probably at the end of March or beginning of April 1815.³⁹ The author argued in favour of France's annexation of the southern provinces. He stated that they are all of French blood (*nous sommes Français par le sang*), and that their nation officially still did not belong to anyone: *Notre pays n'appartient encore à personne, puis qu'il n'en a pas été disposé au congrès de Vienne [...] N'attendons pas alors, O mes concitoyens, que les Français viennent nous chercher; allons au devant d'eux, et jetons nous dans leurs bras* (Our country does not belong to anyone yet, and it was not disposed of at the Congress of Vienna [...] Do not wait then, O my fellow citizens, that the French come to seek us; Let's go ahead of them, and throw ourselves into their arms).⁴⁰ As long as the allied powers had not put their signature to the treaty of Vienna, the future of the Belgian people remained unclear. This pamphlet prompts the question: are there other critical voices to be found? Were they silenced? Or were they perhaps uttered in different media and by other means? Further research is still needed here.

18 JUNE 1815: TRIUMPHANT BROTHERS

A second peak in publications occurred after the battle of Waterloo. As in other countries, the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo led to an explosion of propagandistic writings in the Netherlands. Authors celebrated the restoration of peace in Europe and highlighted the particular contribution of Dutch and Belgian troops to the victory over the French. Only nine days before the battle at Waterloo, the allied troops had signed the Final treaty of Vienna, officially making the Kingdom of the United Netherlands a new European state.

To what extent was this union part of the celebrations taking place after Napoleon's defeat? Which national identity was being celebrated in the flood of publications? It must be said that in the majority of pamphlets, no reference was made to the union: most northern authors expressed their happiness without referring to their fellow countrymen in the south. However, a handful of writings explicitly referred to the union, and they reveal a gap in the northern and southern reactions. They differ in three respects: the description of the battlefield, the references to the national past, and the choice of national heroes.

First, southern poets laid much more emphasis on the actual fighting, the wounded people, and the horrors, whereas the northern poets refrained from sketching too detailed a picture of these scenes. This difference may be explained from the fact that the northern poets literally were further from the battlefield. The northerners reflected upon the events in more distant, abstract terms than the southerners. H. A. Spandaw, a poet from the upper north in the Netherlands, celebrated the victory in much more general terms than his fellow-poet in the south, P. J. Rembry:

(Spandaw:) I saw that fatherland elevated;
Belgian and Batavian united;
And the royal crown given
To him who gives the crown lustre.⁴¹

(Rembry:) Imagine a cloud of people who move on in confusion,
Starved and tired out from head to foot,
Smeared with mud, black from the gunpowder, wounded, covered
with blood, [...]
The victory of the Belgians, after such terrible danger:
It caused young and old to jump for true joy.⁴²

Second, the southerners attributed the victory more to the Belgian soldiers than the Dutch. Words like “Nederland” (Dutch) or “Nederlands” (Dutchness) were used less frequently, “Belgian” dominated throughout these texts. This is the case, for example, in the theatrical play *Belle-Alliance, ou les journées mémorables* (Beautiful Alliance, or the memorable days [Louvain 1815]), written by the poet and publisher Luis-Charles Mallard from Louvain. His piece is one big celebration of the Belgian soldier, whereas the Dutch, Prussian, and English soldiers are hardly mentioned. Nevertheless, the Belgian troops are loyal to one prince only, and that is William I. They often call out, *Vive le Roi! Vive Guillaume!* and in the end, the Belgian commander swears eternal faith to the Dutch king: *je jure obéissance éternelle / A notre prince à notre roi!* (I swear eternal obedience / To our prince, to our king!).⁴³

King William I was praised both in the northern and the southern provinces, but with regard to his son we see a third difference.⁴⁴ The hereditary prince William Frederick was wounded on the battlefield and became the most celebrated hero in the northern provinces. Meanwhile, the southerners created their own cult figure: Jean-Baptiste van Merlen (1773–1815). This general, born in Antwerp, served under Napoleon at

the Battle of Leipzig. After the coronation of Louis XVIII in 1814, he resigned from the French army and joined the Dutch troops. He died at the Battle of Waterloo after being hit by a cannonball. Van Merlen became their local hero as a counterpart to William Frederick in the north.⁴⁵

The popular reactions to the victory at Waterloo show that two different memorial cultures were created, which only partly overlapped. Although the Dutch and Belgian people had fought side by side to defeat Napoleon, it becomes clear that an “intimate and complete union” was not to be easily achieved. A final case in point is a lengthy pamphlet, which appeared anonymously in Arnhem (a city the eastern part of the Netherlands).⁴⁶ It was entitled *The Hand of Brotherhood, Offered by the Northern to the Southern Provinces (De hand van broederschap, door de Noordelijke aan de Zuidelijke Nederlanders toegereikt)* and consisted of a series of 12 letters, which were written partly before and partly after the battle of Waterloo. It offered an extensive account of the advantages of the union between the northern and southern provinces. In this so called “new Dutch empire” (*nieuw Nederlandsche Rijk*), the Dutch language had to become dominant, which meant that southerners would have to start using Dutch as their main language. This also meant that their level of literacy had to be increased. The author recommended a series of recent books on Dutch grammar and speech—including a well-known book by the professor Matthijs Siegenbeek on spelling from 1804—in which he proposed a set of standard rules and practices.⁴⁷ The author also paid considerable attention to the necessity of ensuring a flourishing publishing and book trade and the vital role of the arts in order to obtain new wealth. The perspective was entirely northern: the southern provinces had to be “raised up” and had to adapt themselves to their new political situation as in the injunctions to a subaltern culture in a colonial relationship.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The question of how the Dutch reacted to Napoleon's return is complicated by the fact that the Dutch nation was under construction: national identity was a fluid concept and could refer to different political realities and reflect diverse sentiments. The political union between the northern and southern provinces became topical at two particular moments: (1) directly after William's self-proclamation as king of the United Kingdom

of the Netherlands; and (2) after the victory at the Battle of Waterloo. After William's self-proclamation, the communal bond between the Belgian and Dutch was primarily regarded as essential to the military operation to counter the French threat. In the celebratory writings after Waterloo, a gap between the northern and southern reactions can be witnessed as becomes clear from their different ways of reflecting on their contributions to the great victory. During the entire period, the northern perspective remained dominant; in most northern reactions, the southern provinces were not mentioned at all.

This changed rapidly after the official instalment of the new king, in Brussels, on 21 September. From then on, the celebration of the union between North and South became predominant in patriotic discourses. Exemplary are the following verses of the well-known Dutch poet Hendrik Tollens:

O brothers, come! Return! Return!
 Come quickly, estranged compatriots!
 The barrier has fallen and shattered.
 Come quickly: the paternal blessing awaits you!
 The fraternal heart greets you warmly,
 A cheering welcome rolls towards you!
 The hour of unification has broken.
 [...] our brothers have been returned to us,
 Those who had strayed for two centuries.⁴⁸

Tollens's poem expressed great confidence in the future: at long last, the nation was reunited after having been separated for more than two centuries. His optimism was smashed only fifteen years later when the Belgian Revolution broke out. It turned out that there was little public support in the south for this union and that religious, linguistic, and moral barriers proved insurmountable. If one reads the popular reactions to the Hundred Days, one can already see clear signs that it would be difficult if not impossible to create "a complete and intimate union" between the two nations: each of the nations had created its own memorial culture and wished to remember Waterloo on their own terms.

NOTES

1. W., *Triumf-zang, bij het inrukken der geallieerde legers, onder bevel der veldmaarschalken Wellington en Blucher, binnen Parijs. Op den 6^e van hooimaand* (Alkmaar, 1815), 7–8.
2. See N. C. F. van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa 1813–1831* (Groningen, 1985), 55–60; Beatrice de Graaf, "Second-tier Diplomacy. Hans von Gagern and William I in their Quest for an Alternative European Order, 1813–1818," *Journal for Modern European History* 12 (2014): 552–554.
3. Jeroen Koch, *Koning Willem I, 1772–1843* (Amsterdam, 2013), 228–259.
4. The Eight Articles of London were literally incorporated in the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. See *Handelingen van het Kongres van Weenen, zoo als dezelve aldaar, op den 9 juny 1815, door de respectieve gevolmagtigden der geallieerde mogendheden onderteekend zyn* ('s-Gravenhage, 1815), 43.
5. The collection is also called the "Knuttel-collection" and can be accessed at www.kb.nl (The Early Modern Pamphlets Online).
6. See on this patriotic discourse: Lotte Jensen, "The Dutch Against Napoleon. Resistance Literature and National Identity, 1806–1813," *Journal of Dutch Literature* 2/2 (2011): 5–26.
7. Alistair Duke, "In Defence of the Common Fatherland. Patriotism and Liberty in the Low Countries, 1555–1576," in R. Stein and J. Pollmann (eds.), *Networks, Regions and Nations. Shaping Identities in the Low Countries, 1300–1650* (Leiden and Boston, 2010), 217–239.
8. See Lotte Jensen, *Celebrating Peace. The Emergence of Dutch Identity, 1648–1815* (Nijmegen, 2017).
9. N. C. F. van Sas, "De vaderlandse imperatief. Begripsverandering en politieke conjunctuur, 1763–1813," in N. C. F. van Sas ed., *Vaderland. Een geschiedenis vanaf de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940* (Amsterdam, 1999), 275–308.
10. Jensen, "The Dutch Against Napoleon."
11. Historical works exist that describe the making of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. A recent collection of essays is: Ido de Haan, Paul den Hoed and Henk te Velde (eds.), *Een nieuwe staat. Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Amsterdam, 2013).
12. Van Sas also points out the influential role that Clancarty played in the whole process. See *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*. 45–109, especially 102–103. On Von Gagern, see Beatrice de Graaf, "Second-tier Diplomacy,"
13. Quoted in George Edmundson, "The Low Countries," in D. A. Acton, A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and S. Leathes, *The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X: The Restoration* (Cambridge, 1907), 519. The French text reads: "Cette réunion devra être intime et complète, de façon que

- les deux pays ne forment qu'un seul et même État, régi par la constitution déjà établie en Hollande, et qui sera modifiée d'un commun accord, après les nouvelles circonstances." See *Actes du Congrès de Vienne* (Paris, 1816), 213, in which the Eight Articles are included in an appendix.
14. See for the so called "Taalbesluit" (Language Resolution) Janneke Weijermars, *Stepbrothers. Southern Dutch Literature and Nation-Building Under Willem I, 1814–1834* (Leiden and Boston, 2014), 21–39. The press and marriage restrictions are discussed in M. M. S., *Le cri de l'oppression ou lettre d'un Belge à ses concitoyens* (Paris, S.A.), 4–7.
 15. De Graaf, "Second-tier Diplomacy," 557–559. According to Van Sas, the Dutch interests were mostly advocated by Clancarty. See Van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, 102–103.
 16. See, for example, Renger de Bruin, Kornee van der Haven, Lotte Jensen, David Onnekink (eds.), *Performances of Peace. Utrecht 1713* (Leiden and Boston, 2015).
 17. See, for example, Lotte Jensen, *Celebrating Peace*, 163–182 and B. A. de Graaf, "Bringing Sense and Sensibility to the Continent—Vienna 1815 Revisited," *Journal of Modern European History* 13 (2015): 447–457.
 18. Adam Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror. Political Paranoia and the Creation of the Modern State, 1789–1848* (New York, 2014).
 19. The independency of Belgium was acknowledged by King William I in 1839.
 20. Etienne François und Hagen Schulze, "Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen," in *Mythen der Nationen: ein Europäisch Panorama*, ed. Monika Flacke (München and Berlin, 1998), 17–32; Lotte Jensen, "Introduction," in *The Roots of Nationalism. National Identity Formation in Early Modern Europe, 1600–1815*, ed. Lotte Jensen (Amsterdam, 2016), 9–27.
 21. Jean Stengers, *Les racines de la Belgique. Histoire du sentiment national en Belgique des origines à 1918*, vol. 1 (Brussels, 2000), 101.
 22. Sébastien Dubois, *L'invention de la Belgique. Genèse d'un État-Nation* (Brussels, 2005), 133–143.
 23. *Rotterdamsche Courant* (11-03-1815).
 24. Jurriën de Jong, Ben Schoenmaker and Jeroen van Zanten. *Waterloo. 200 jaar strijd* (Amsterdam, 2015), 49–50.
 25. De Jong, Schoenmaker, and Van Zanten. *Waterloo*, 49–55; Johan Op de Beeck, *Waterloo. De laatste 100 dagen van Napoleon* (Antwerpen, 2013), 142–153.
 26. For a general overview of the Dutch reactions to the Hundred Days, see Lotte Jensen, "De hand van broederschap toegereikt' Nederlandse identiteiten en identiteitsbesef in 1815," in *Belg en Bataaf. De wording van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, eds. Frank Judo and Stijn Van de Perre (Antwerpen, 2015), 79–101, 343–349.

27. Petronella Moens, *Bij het intrekken van Napoleon Buonaparte in Parijs* (Utrecht, 1815), 15: "Nee, dierbaar Vaderland! Met zulke heldenzielen; / Met zulk een edlen Vorst, ducht gij verraad noch magt. [...] / Ja, 't laatste hartebloed van Hollands kroost zal vloeijen; [...] / Eer hier de Corsikaan zijn aadlaars weër doet zwieren./Neen, 't roemrijk Neêrland moet verbroederd zegevieren / God kroont hier 's Konings deugd en strijdt voor't Heldenvolk."
28. Maria Petronella Elter, geb. Woesthoven, *Nederland in Frankrijk in maart, 1815. Lierzang* (Amsterdam, 1815).
29. T.[ollens?], *Aan de Nederlanders* (S.l., 1815), 1: "tweeden Eersten Willem."
30. A. N. Pellecom, *Wapenkreet*. Schiedam, 1815, 15: "Komt, fluks de wapens van den wand! Het is de strijd voor't Vaderland, / Voor God en voor den Koning!"
31. The historian Wilfried Uitterhoeve has shown that the months after the liberation from the French were full of chaotic events and political riots. See Wilfried Uitterhoeve, *1813- Haagse bluf. De korte chaos van vrijwording* (Nijmegen, 2013).
32. Jan Schouten, *Opwekking ten strijd in april 1815. Lierzang* (Rotterdam, 1815, dated 19 April), 6: "Verzelt den Belgen en Bataven / In 't strijden voor hun Vorst en Land."
33. J. S. Swaan, *Aan mijne Nederlandsche landgenooten, bij het bezetten van Parijs door Buonaparte* (Hoorn, 1815), 3: "Gij ziet [...] Der pijlen bundel weër herbonden, / Die voor twee eeuwen't grimmig lot / Had losgescheurd. [...] / Bataaf en Belg staan hand in hand. / Zij hebben't eigen vaderland. / Zij hebben d'eigen roem te schragen. / D'Oranjeboom schenkt beiden vrucht."
34. *Vaderlander, Stryd! Voor God! Den Koning! En het vaderland* (Amsterdam, 1815), 6: "Help God! – beziel, versterk, den Grooten Alexander! / Help Oostenrijk! – Germaan! En eedlen Pruisch en Brith! / Sla aller Vorsten hand onschroefbaar in elkander;/ Tot het bereiken van uw heilig doel en wit:/ Zóó strijde en Belg! Bataaf! Met hunnen Oranje Koning! / Tot steun van Nederland eendrachtig onderling."
35. Jacobus Scheltema, *Wat willen – wat zullen nu de Franschen – wat moeten wij doen? [...]* (Amsterdam, 1815); Jan ten Brink, *Kort betoog, dat de verbondene mogendheden geregtigd en verplicht zijn, om Napoléon Buonaparte van den Franschen troon met geweld van wapenen te verdrijven* (Amsterdam, 1815).
36. Scheltema, *Wat willen – wat zullen nu de Franschen*, 16: *Aller harten moeten zaamgebonden zijn door den naam van Nederlander; onze taal zij het vereenigingspunt.*

37. *Waarom vreest men toch thans zoo zeer, of bemoedigende gesprekken tusschen drie vrienden* (Rotterdam, 1815), 28. From the content it becomes clear that the pamphlet must have been written shortly after Napoleon's return to Paris (see the reference to this event on page 4).
38. *Waarom vreest men toch thans zoo zeer*, 29.
39. The author refers to the news of Napoleon's return to Paris, see: M. M. S., *Le cri de l'oppression, ou lettre d'un Belge à ses concitoyens* (Paris, 1815), 21. The pamphlet is signed by M. Schilderman.
40. M. M. S., *Le cri de l'oppression*, 30.
41. H. A. Spandaw, *Nederlands behoud, in 1815; lierzang* (Groningen, 1815), 3: "k Zag dat Vaderland verheven; / Belg en Batavier hereend; / En de Koningskroon gegeven / Hem die kroonen luister leent."
42. P. J. Rembry, *De daegen Van den sestiende, seventiende en achtiende Juny 1815* (Antwerpen, 1815), 16–17: "Verbeélt u wolke volks [...] Verhongerd, en vermat van hoofde tot aen voet, / Bemodderd, zwart van't kruyd, gekwetst, bedekt van bloed, [...] / De zége van den Belg, naer zoo vreeslyk gevaer: / Dit deed daer oud en jong van ware vreugd opspringen."
43. Louis-Charles Mallard, *Belle-alliance, ou les journées mémorables des seize, dix-sept et dix-huits juin 1815* [...].
44. As Alan Forrest rightly observes, the Dutch commemoration was mainly focused on the House of Orange, and their laudable contribution to Waterloo, rather than the people. See Alan Forrest, *Waterloo* (Oxford, 2015), 165–171.
45. See on the celebration of different heroes in the northern and southern provinces also Janneke Weijermars, "De mythe van Waterloo. De Slag bij Waterloo in de Nederlandse literatuur, 1815–1830," in *Oorlogsliteratuur in de vroegmoderne tijd. Vorm, identiteit, herinnering*, eds. Lotte Jensen and Nina Geerdink (Hilversum, 2013), 182–197.
46. *De hand van broederschap, door de Noordelijke aan de Zuidelijke Nederlanders toegereikt* [...] (Arnhem, 1815).
47. Matthys Siegenbeek, *Verhandeling over de Nederduitsche Spelling* (Amsterdam, 1804).
48. H. Tollens, C. Z., *Bij de verheffing van zijne koninklijke hoogheid Willem Frederik Prins van Oranje en Nassau op den troon der Nederlanden. Lierzang* (Den Haag, 1815), 7–8: "Snelt toe, onze armen zijn omsloten: / o Broeders, komt! keert weer! keert weer! / Snelt toe, vervreemde landgenooten! / De slagboom viel verguizeld neêr / Snelt toe: u wacht de vaderzegen! / Het broederhart gloeit u tegen, / Het welkom rolt u juichend aan! / 't Vereeningsuur is aangebroken [...] de broedren zijn ons weergegeven / Twee eeuwen lang van ons afgedwaald."

"A People Grown Old in Revolutions": Conflicting Temporalities and Distrust in 1815 Italy

Martina Piperno

The "Hundred Days" are not normally regarded as an episode of significance to Italian history, although military and cultural movements connected to them marked the peninsula in the spring of 1815, in particular, Joaquim Murat's military campaign against the Austrians. By looking mostly at literary reactions (poems, orations, novels) to the event and to the literary construction of Murat's figure, and by considering unpublished material that has not been an object of scholarly attention until now, I will attempt to draw a faithful picture of the conflicting cultural responses of 1815 Italy. As I will show, these responses were characterized by indecisiveness, weariness, confusion about legitimacy and consent, and a sense of loss: signs of a post-traumatic crisis. In this essay, I challenge current historio-graphical interpretations of the events of 1815, which identify them as the first phase of the Italian Risorgimento.

M. Piperno (✉)
University College, Cork, UK
e-mail: martina.piperno@gmail.com

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